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Pirates Ahoy!:
The Modern Pirate Menace off the Horn of Africa
Clive Schofield∗

Introduction
Pirates ahoy! A line from the script of a Hollywood cutlass-and-buried-treasure
blockbuster? Not quite, especially as far as the waters off the Horn of Africa are
concerned in recent years. Pirates have long held the status of romantic and daring
figures in the popular imagination, thanks in no small part to novels such as
Stevenson’s Treasure Island and the swashbuckling films of Errol Flynn and
company. More recently Johnny Depp, of Pirates of the Caribbean fame, also has a
lot to answer for. However, piracy presents a serious modern day menace to the
mariner.
The main loci of piracy attacks in recent years have been the Indonesian and
Philippines archipelagos and the Malacca Straits in Southeast Asia, the Bay of Bengal,
the Gulf of Guinea and the Horn of Africa. Whilst considerable efforts have been
made to address the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea, especially in
Southeast Asia (see box?), much remains to be done. In particular, there has been a
surge in acts of piracy and attacks against shipping in the Gulf of Aden and off
Somalia’s eastern coast in the Indian Ocean in recent months, making these waters
comfortably the most dangerous on the planet.
In response the United Nations has passed a number of Resolutions authorising the
use of force to combat the pirate menace. A number of states have rushed warships to
the region, leading to an unprecedented concentration of naval vessels in the region.
Despite these efforts, piratical attacks have continued and, alarmingly, become more
rather than less frequent.
This article seeks to address some key questions that arise in the context of piracy and
the particular brand of piracy taking place off the Horn of Africa in particular. Who
are the pirates and how do they operate? What are the key causes of the Somali piracy
phenomenon? Moreover, what is being done to meet the threat to shipping and
freedom of navigation that the pirates pose, what challenges arise in this context and
what are the prospects for the future?
While the main focus of this article is on the complex situation off the shores of
Somalia, first the questions arise: what do we mean by the term “pirate” and what
exactly constitutes an act of piracy versus the closely related concept of armed
robbery at sea.
Definitional Dilemmas: When is a “pirate” not a pirate?
The term “piracy” is frequently misapplied. Strictly speaking, under Article 101 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, piracy only refers to acts taking
place outside the territorial sea. Such territorial seas are usually 12 nautical miles in

breadth. 1 Piracy-style acts taking place within the territorial sea, that is, the vast
majority of attacks worldwide, are therefore not “piracy” in international legal terms
and are instead simply referred to as “armed robbery against ships.” That said, the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has adopted a more all-encompassing definition
of piracy as, “an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any
other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance thereof.”
The broader IMB definition is used here.
A further caveat peculiar to the Somali context is that Somalia actually claims a 200
nautical mile broad territorial sea. This is, however, an anachronistic claim which has
simply not been updated to accord with international legal developments – something
that is in large part attributable to the fact that Somalia has had no functioning central
government since 1991. As the international norm for the breadth of the territorial sea
is 12 nautical miles, Somalia’s claim is generally not recognised by other states.
Dangerous Waters: The Rise of Piracy off the Horn of Africa
The problem of piracy-style attacks against shipping off the Horn of Africa is by no
means new. Over 700 attacks against ships were recorded in the period 1993-2005.
There was a noticeable dip in attacks in late 2006, coinciding with the rise of the
Union of Islamic Courts which, in accordance with Sharia law, “declared war” on
piracy. A military intervention on the part of Ethiopia, backed by the United States
which was concerned over the rise of Islamic forces in Somalia and potential links to
Al-Qaeda, ostensibly in support of the largely ineffectual Somali Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) led to the toppling of the Islamic Courts in late 2006. Since that
time, Ethiopian forces have withdrawn and Somalia has been plagued by instability
including an insurgency campaign on the part of radical Islamic forces which has
restricting the internationally recognised TFG to control of a few blocks of the capital,
Mogadishu. The pirates, meanwhile, have gone back to business with renewed vigour.
During 2007 pirate attacks off Somalia more than doubled, while hijackings rose to a
high of 31. According to the IMB Somali waters accounted for 111 reported pirate
attacks in 2008, resulting in 42 successful hijackings (close to 40 per cent of the 293
attacks reported internationally). Despite the counter-piracy efforts of international
naval forces from late 2008, the figures for 2009 are considerably worse. The total
number of incidents attributed to the Somali pirates during 2009 was 217 with 47
vessels hijacked and 867 crewmembers taken hostage. Indeed, in 2009 Somalia
accounted for more than half of piracy incidents globally.
A diverse range of vessels have been attacked – from relatively small vessels such as
traditional dhows, yachts and fishing trawlers to larger merchant vessels, oil tankers
and even luxury cruise liners carrying hundreds of tourists. Among the more eyecatching recent incidents was the seizure at the end of September 2008 of the
Ukrainian (though Belize registered) freighter, the MV Faina, carrying 33 Russianmade T-72 tanks, spare parts and ammunition. The highly lucrative nature of the
piracy business was emphasised by the reported US$3.2 million ransom delivered to
the pirates in return for the release of the vessel, crew and cargo in early February
2009. Yet more startling was the 15 November 2008 hijacking of the Sirius Star, a
1

One international standard nautical mile equates to 1,852m, which is equivalent to 1 minute of
latitude (1/60th of 1° of latitude) at around 44° latitude. A nautical mile is therefore longer than a statute
mile (5,280 feet or 1,760 yards equating to 1,609m).

brand-new, Saudi owned super tanker carrying a cargo of two million barrels of oil
valued at in excess of one hundred million dollars. The stunning seizure of such a
large (330m and 318,000 dead weight tons) and modern (launched in April 2008 and
costing an estimated US$150m to build) vessel with such apparent ease grabbed
headlines around the world. Once again the vessel, crew and cargo were released once
a ransom, estimated at US$3 million was paid to the Somali pirates on board the
vessel on 9 January 2009.
Furthermore, on 8 April 2009, Somali pirates seized the cargo ship MV Maersk
Alabama, a US flagged vessel 240 nautical miles south of the Somali port city of Eyl.
Although the crew retook the vessel, capturing the leader of the pirates in the process,
the ship’s captain surrendered himself to ensure his crew’s safety. The pirates fled in
one of the ship’s covered lifeboats and the ensuing stand-off between the pirates and
the US naval vessel despatched to the scene, the USS Bainbridge, was brought to an
end by US Navy Seal snipers who killed three of the pirates on board the life boat and
freed Captain Phillips. The remaining pirate involved has been transferred to New
York and is currently facing trial.
Yachts and even large cruise liners carrying hundreds of passengers have not proved
to be immune from piratical attack. Several French yachts have been sized, leading to
some dramatic rescue efforts on the part of French Special Forces. With regard to
cruise liners, the first such attack took place against the Seabourn Spirit in November
2005 (see below). More recently, on 30 November 2008 the luxury cruise liner, the
M/S Nautica, carrying over 1,000 passengers and crew, was attacked by pirates in two
small skiffs whilst transiting the Gulf of Aden. Although the Nautica was able to
evade the would-be pirates, they got close enough to open fire with small-arms.
Similarly, on 26 April the Italian cruise ship the Melody, with around 1,500
passengers and crew on board, was attacked but the would-be pirates broke off their
attack when security guards on board the liner opened fire over their heads.
Key Causes
Fundamentally the key causes of the Somali piracy phenomenon lie ashore. Piracy
essentially emerged off the Somali coast following the fall of the Siad Barre regime in
1991. The Somali central government collapsed and large swaths of the country have
been ruled by clans and warlords ever since. The situation deteriorated still further
with the withdrawal of the UN mission in 1995 (the movie Blackhawk Down able
demonstrating why). Somalia is therefore generally regarded as the prime example of
a failed state. Instability, insecurity and the near absence of law and order on land has
unsurprisingly spilled offshore.
That said the prevailing view of Somalia as a whole as an ungoverned, and
ungovernable, state does represent something of an oversimplification. While large
parts of the country certainly remain in the control of clans, warlords and insurgents,
parts of Somalia have enjoyed a remarkable degree of relative stability and security.
In particular the ‘Republic of Somaliland’, which declared its independence from
Somalia on 18 May 1991 arguing that it joined Somalia voluntarily, and that it should
have the right to leave the Union, possesses functioning civil and security services
(including a maritime element), judiciary and democratic elections. Indeed,
Somaliland boasts many of the key attributes of statehood that Somalia itself
evidently lacks but its independence has yet to be recognised by another state.

Additionally, the self-styled ‘Puntland State of Somalia’, located to the east of
Somaliland, has long sought autonomy within, rather than outright independence from
Somalia. It is in Puntland where many of the pirate groups currently operating reside,
though it should be noted that the picture here is complex. Although representatives of
Puntland have frequently declared their determination to eradicate the pirates
operating from its territory, little seems to have been done. For example, in June 2009
the President of Puntland called for international support to enhance his government’s
control over its territory, oppose the pirates in their safe havens and establish an
effective coastguard. Such support has been slow in coming amid fears on the part of
potential donors that funds and equipment will be wasted, disappear or, worse, simply
be diverted to pirate interests. The suggestion here is that those funded and equipped
to act as coastguards may instead engage in piracy themselves.
Profound poverty also represents a powerful motivating factor. Many Somalis are
near destitute with around one third of the country’s 10 million strong population are
dependent on food aid. In this context the huge sums to be made from piracy are thus
just too enticing.
A further important but generally under-reported, factor underlying the rise of Somali
piracy is the fact that many Somalis feel disenfranchised and exploited by foreign
powers. For example, the Somali coast has been used as a site for the dumping of
toxic, including radioactive, waste from abroad. Furthermore and of particular note
here is the fact that foreign trawlers exploit Somalia’s fisheries with impunity (see
below).
An additional and important factor in this regard is Somalia’s proximity of Somalia to
busy shipping lanes – 22,000 ships per year traverse the Gulf of Aden, primarily en
route to or from the Suez Canal (linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas and thus a
key link between Europe and Asia) – making these waters a ‘target rich’ environment
from the pirates’ point of view. An allied consideration here is the willingness of the
shipping industry and insurers to pay hefty ransoms. Piracy has, consequently,
developed into an especially lucrative business, with the ‘going rate’ for the release of
a ship and crew has been put at US$500,000 to US$2 million, or more, as proved by
the ransoms for the release of the Faina and Sirius Star.
The other “pirates” operating off the Horn of Africa
Somalia’s 3,300 km coastline, the longest of a mainland African state, coupled with
its broad maritime claims mean that Somalia has a huge maritime jurisdiction. The
Somalia current marine ecosystem generates an intense upwelling of nutrient-rich
cold waters. As a result, Somali offshore areas are productive in terms of marine
living resources, including high-value fish stocks such as tunas. In the absence of any
national maritime surveillance and enforcement effort following the collapse of the
Somali state, these waters have proved vulnerable and too tempting to foreign
poachers.
The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates there are
“700 foreign-owned vessels fully engaged in unlicensed fishing in Somali waters”.
There have been reports that foreign fishers have engaged in destructive fishing
practices such as bottom trawling, endangering Somali fishing stocks.

It has been estimated that the value of these illegal catches from Somalia’s maritime
jurisdiction vary from in excess of US$90 million to US$300 million per year. If the
latter figure is the case then this is roughly three times the sum said to have been paid
out by the shipping industry in ransoms to the pirates in 2008. Indeed, it has been
observed, not without bitterness, that foreign fishing vessels are in fact taking
considerably more protein out of Somalia’s waters than the international community
are supplying to Somalia in the form of humanitarian food aid.
These foreign fishing vessels reportedly hail from the immediate region, including
Kenya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Yemen and from further afield,
including Belize, France, Honduras, Japan, South Korea, Spain and Taiwan. It is
especially ironic that a number of the nations that are presently contributing warships
to the anti-piracy flotillas patrolling the waters off the Horn of Africa, are themselves
directly linked to the foreign fishing vessels that are busily stealing Somalia’s
offshore resources. The international naval presence in the region is not, however,
tasked with restraining such illegal fishing activities in Somali waters.
The activities of foreign fishing vessels have resulted in ugly confrontations with local
fishers. It has been reported that foreign fishing boats have sought to drive Somali
fishermen away from their traditional fishing grounds, using high-pressure or boiling
water hoses and even firearms to that end. In the face of the blatant theft of Somalia’s
marine living resources it is perhaps unsurprisingly that some former fishermen have
turned their maritime skills to an alternative profession. It has also allowed pirates to
try and justify their actions – several pirate groups style themselves “coastguards” or
“marines” and characterise their ransom demands as “fines”. Indeed, it seems likely
that many of the pirates themselves started out as fishermen. Whilst foreign poaching
of Somali fish in no way justifies violent acts of piracy or armed robbery at sea and
that the pirates’ targets are not confined to foreign trawlers, the systematic plundering
of Somalia’s resources by foreign fishing fleets remains a potent underlying and
motivating factor in the Somali piracy phenomenon. Without condoning acts of
violence at sea, it can be observed that the Somalis who hijack shipping off their coast
are in fact not the only ‘pirates’ operating in these waters.
The modus operandi of Somali pirates
The attacks outlined above highlight the fact that the primary objective of Somali
pirates is to take control of vessels attacked and take the crew hostage with a view to
negotiating a ransom payment (termed “KnRs” standing for “kidnap and ransom”).
Somali piracy is therefore distinct from the vast majority of attacks against shipping
that occur elsewhere around the world, including other piracy hotspots such as the
Bay of Bengal, Gulf of Guinea and in Indonesian waters. Rather than involving hitand-run style attacks with the aim of robbing the ship’s safe and relieving the crew of
their valuables, attacks off the Somali coast often take place in broad daylight with the
objective of seizing the ship as a whole.
The ‘tools of the trade’ for Somali pirates include small, fast boats or skiffs, equipped
with high-powered engines. The pirates have ready access to high-tech equipment
such as satellite phones and navigation gear (global positioning systems, GPS). They
also have little difficulty in accessing their main weapons of choice – Kalashnikov
automatic rifles (the ubiquitous AK47) and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) as,

according to UN estimates, there are in excess of two million such small arms in
Mogadishu alone.
A common tactic is to open fire in order to try and make vessels slow or heave-to.
Often multiple boats are used in ‘swarm’ or decoy type tactics. Somali pirates have
also been known to use of fake distress calls as a ruse to lure unwary ships within
range. Distinguishing between fake and genuine calls for aid can therefore prove
problematic (as many Somalis seek to flee the country, particularly from Bossaso to
Yemen, using often dilapidated and overloaded boats, real distress calls are by no
means unheard of in these waters). Alternatively, pirates have posed as distressed
fishermen in need of water supplies. This may lead to genuine fishermen being
mistaken for pirates. It has also been reported that as shipping has tended to avoid the
Somali coast and sail as close as possible to the Yemeni coast on the Gulf of Aden,
pirate skiffs have taken to hiding among groups of Yemeni fishermen until their
potential victims come within range.
A further tactic of note relates to the use of ‘mother ships’ (a larger vessel used as a
base by smaller craft) or ‘brother ships’ (a larger skiff, filled with fuel, towing other
skiffs) in order to extend pirates’ range of operations. The hijacking of the Sirus Star,
450 nautical miles offshore, represents a striking example of this practice. As Admiral
Mike Mullen, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff commented on 18
November 2008: “I’m stunned by the range of it”. Indeed, there is evidence of a shift
in pirate tactics, apparently in response to increased patrolling on the part of
international naval forces, including attacks much further offshore, off the coasts of
Somalia and Kenya in the Indian Ocean. For example, on 10 November 2009, an oil
tanker, the BW Lion, was attacked around 1000nm off the Somali coast (400nm
northeast of the Seychelles).
The International Response
The primary international response to piracy off Somalia has been a military one
featuring an enhanced naval presence and increased patrols. Naval vessels from the
United States, a number of European states (notably Britain, Germany, France and
Spain), Canada, India, Iran, South Korea, Malaysia, Russia, Turkey, and, most
recently, Australia are now active, or will soon reach, the waters off the Horn of
Africa. This has led to remarkable and unprecedented international naval cooperation
designed to counter piracy, including the creation of multiple cooperative naval
operations in the region. In October 2008 NATO established a counter-piracy
operation called Allied Provider and in December of the same year the European
Union initiated Operation Atalanta, including warships from ten countries, while in
January 2009 the United States established Combined Task Force (CTF) 151.
The naval vessels rushed to the region started by providing escorts for World Food
Program chartered cargo ships delivering sorely needed humanitarian aid shipments to
Somalia. In order to better protect shipping in the perilous Gulf of Aden area, an
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) has been established.
However, even this does not guarantee security for shipping as, even with the
significantly enhanced naval presence now in the region, there are simply not enough
warships to provide comprehensive patrols.

A key practical difficulty facing the commanders of the naval vessels involved is the
vast area to be patrolled, especially in view of the proven reach of the pirates, coupled
with the speed of attacks. Even with the increased naval presence in the region,
patrols cannot be everywhere and commonly as little as 15 minutes may elapse from
attack detection to hijacking. The challenge facing the navies now patrolling the
waters off the Horn of Africa is therefore to catch pirates in the act – an extremely
difficult task. A further problem relates to how to tell with certainty who exactly the
pirates really are. As noted above, pirates often masquerade as innocent (albeit
heavily armed) fishermen. The mere possession of arms is not proof of piratical intent
or guilt (almost every small vessel operating in these waters will carry arms for selfprotection).
Once the pirates are in control of a vessel and have hostages at their disposal, the
problem becomes significantly more complicated. In this context, a series of French
yachts have been seized off the Horn of Africa and France has responded in a
particularly robust manner. While these actions, commonly featuring the deployment
of French Special Forces, have met with considerable success, they have also come at
a cost – in the storming of the yacht Tanit in April 2009, for example, although the
operation was a success in that four hostages were freed, one hostage (and two
pirates) lost their lives in the action. This demonstrates the hazards inevitably
involved in this type of intervention.
These naval operations are set against the backdrop of a series of progressively more
stringent UN Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
notably Resolution 1816 (of 2 June 2008) which authorises states cooperating with the
Somali Transitional Federal Government to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and
use “all necessary means” to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, though
in a manner “consistent with the relevant provisions of international law.” This
Resolution was renewed through the adoption of Resolution 1816 on 2 December
2008 which extended the international community’s mandate for another 12 months.
A further Resolution, no.1851 of 16 December 2008 authorised measures to facilitate
more effective law enforcement (see below) and also permitted the international
community to operate not only within Somali waters but also within the land territory
of Somalia which is used to plan, facilitate or undertake acts of piracy and armed
robbery.
Practical responses: what can the mariner do?
In short: don’t go! The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) recommends that all
vessels “keep as far away as possible from the Somali coast, ideally more than 600
nautical miles” offshore. If the IMBs advice is followed, shipping will be well out of
very high frequency (VHF) radio range of land and, therefore, less likely to be
detected by vigilant pirate groups on shore. However, a glance at the map suggests
that this is easier said than done. The coastal geography of the Horn of Africa and
proximity of Somalia to the constricted approaches to the Bab al-Mandab choke point
at the southern end of the Red Sea makes staying 600 miles distant from the Somali
coast a physical impossibility.
The alternative way of attempting to steer clear of the Somali pirates is to avoid the
Suez Canal route entirely and opt for the significantly longer, and thus considerably
more expensive, route by way of the Cape of Good Hope. Certainly some major

shipping companies have made this decision, no doubt motivated in part by the fact
that shipping insurance rates for vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden have
increased ten-fold of late. As noted, however, that through the use of mother ships,
pirates have a remarkably reach. The Sirius Star, for instance, was hijacked 450
nautical miles offshore whilst taking precisely this option – en route from the Persian
Gulf to the USA by way of the Cape of Good Hope.
Ordinarily, a large vessel such as the Sirius Star, when under way, represents a
formidable target for pirates seeking to board from small boats. When moving slowly
and when full-laden, however, such vessels become much easier prey. With a full load
of oil on board the freeboard (that is, the distance from the surface of the water to the
deck of the ship) on such vessels can be only 3-4 metres – a distance easily overcome
with a grapnel and line.
The IMB therefore also advises vessels traversing pirate-threatened waters to maintain
a strict 24 hours radar and anti-piracy watch (something that is difficult to achieve
given the scale of some vessels and the small crews on board) and, in particular, to
watch for “small suspicious boats converging on vessel”. Coordination with the
international naval forces present in the region is also highly recommended. Vigilance
and early detection enables the Master of the threatened vessel maximum opportunity
to increase speed and engage in evasive manoeuvres. Indeed, speed is regarded as a
key factor with vessels travelling at 18 knots and above generally considered to be
immune to boarding from small boats. Similarly, if a vessel’s freeboard is 8m or more,
this also seems to provide adequate protection when under way.
Early detection also provides the opportunity to mobilize anti-piracy responses. Such
responses may involve the use of high-pressure water hoses and foam. They may also
include the use of barbed or razor wire to make boarding more difficult. More lowtech measures include the use of mannequins or dummy sailors to give the appearance
that more crew/guards are on board the vessel than there actually are. Additionally,
new technologies are increasingly being introduced such as electric fencing for
shipping (though this is not suitable in all cases as electricity and flammable vapour
makes for an explosive mix) and the use of ‘sonic weapons’ such as long-range
acoustic devices (LRAD) – which generate noises at painful, but non-lethal decibel
levels with the aim of disorienting and deterring potential pirates.
Indeed, the failure of the attack on the Seabourn Spirit, a cruise liner carrying 302
passengers and crew at the time of the attack on the morning of 5 November 2005,
has been attributed in part to countermeasures by the ship’s crew. The captain headed
for the open sea and increased speed to outmanoeuvre and outrun their attackers. As
the pirates gave chase, high-pressure water hoses and LRAD were deployed to
prevent boarding. The Seabourn Spirit escaped without being boarded and with no
serious casualties. Nonetheless, one rocket-propelled grenade round did penetrate the
hull, while another reportedly bounced off the ship’s stern, illustrating the potential
risk.
The option of arming non-military vessels has, however, not generally been greeted
with much enthusiasm from authorities or mariners alike. In certain circumstances,
private security guards have been hired. For example, Somali militiamen have on
occasion been recruited to guard vessels carrying humanitarian aid shipments.

Similarly, the private, armed security guards on board the Melody were crucial to
fending off the attack above-mentioned attack on that vessel. Alternatively, in certain
circumstances States have embarked teams of Special Forces personnel on merchant
vessels, usually of their own flag, to provide ship borne security. Rather more
unconventionally, Chinese sailors have used improvised Molotov cocktails to fight off
pirates attacking their vessel. The practical and logistical (as well as financial)
challenges that this type of practice raise are, however, considerable.
Legal dilemmas
If pirates are captured the question then becomes one of what to do with them. As
there is no functioning central government operating in Somalia, there is no authority
to hand captured pirates over to. It is the case, though, that they could be tried under
the capturing state’s laws. Indeed, piracy has long been regarded as one of the select
few crimes against the whole world and is therefore subject to universal jurisdiction
which means that piracy is punishable by any state regardless of the nationality of the
victim or perpetrators. This unusual exception to the norm of territorial and
nationality based criminal jurisdiction indicates the extent to which piratical activities
have been regarded as a widespread scourge.
Practical obstacles do, however, arise which have tended to discourage capturing
states from prosecuting pirates in their own courts. For example, if convicted the
pirates would then have to be imprisoned in the capturing state and this actually
represents a considerable financial burden. Moreover, even when such individuals
have served their time, it may be difficult to return them to Somalia on human rights
grounds as there is a legitimate concern that they may be subject to torture or
execution on their return. All of these factors serve as and disincentives to action.
The EU and USA have, with some success, been attempting to side-step these
problems through transfer agreements with Kenya, allowing for the trial of alleged
pirates there instead. This expedient option is, however, problematic given the
overloaded nature of the Kenyan criminal justice system. It is also the case that legal
challenges have already arisen over whether Kenya can try pirates that it did not
apprehend for crimes outside its jurisdiction. Furthermore, there have been allegations
of physical abuse of detainees in Kenyan prisons, laying the transferring states open to
accusations of facilitating human rights abuses.
The ‘Rolls-Royce’ option in this context is to establish a specialist tribunal
specifically for pirates. This does, of course, then raise the tricky issue of who is to
pay for such an inevitably highly expensive legal solution. A further option raised by
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in April 2009 involves the freezing pirate
financial assets. While superficially this sounds promising, the reality is more
problematic as the Somali pirate gangs do not appear to be especially well integrated
into the global financial system.
As a result of these practical obstacles to bringing pirates to justice, a number of
countries with naval vessels deployed to the region, including Australia, are
effectively operating a ‘catch and release’ policy, simply confiscating the arms used
but otherwise leaving the pirates to return another day – hardly an effective deterrent.
Prospects

Current responses to the Somali piracy phenomenon generally treat the symptoms
rather than the root causes – how pirates are able to operate from secure safe havens
on land and why individuals are driven to become pirates in the first place. Indeed, it
is likely that naval actions are likely to, at most, result in only ephemeral victories.
Driven by poverty and the plundering of Somali offshore resources, in the absence of
governmental control on land to restrain criminal activities and allied to ready access
to maritime skills and military hardware plus proximity to busy shipping lanes replete
with tempting targets, it is little wonder that piracy has flourished off Somalia.
Ultimately, until peace, stable political governance and the rule of law are restored in
Somalia, something that unfortunately seems to be far over the horizon, piracy seems
set to continue off the Horn of Africa.
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